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Technical means ofmonitoring are used to verify compliance to arms control treaties. Numerical 
estimates are developed in order to quantify some aspects of (1) nuclear testing (signatures, 
optical double pulse calibration, decoupling in cavities, and high-frequency components in 
seismic signals), (2) optical reconnaissance (films versus CCDs, air turbulence, adaptive optics, 
and digital image processing), (3) infrared (resolution and detection sensitivity), and (4) radar 
(synthetic aperture and missile coefficient). 
I.INTRODUCI'ION 
Over the past several decades there has been remarkable 
progress in some military technologies such as the in­
creased accuracy of missiles with guidance using stellar 
locations, Navstar Global Positioning Satellites (GPS), 
and terrain mapping (TERCOM). At the same time, there 
has been considerable progress in the technologies which 
enhance the monitoring of military activities and systems 
of"the other side." These improvements have been both in 
quality, with better resolution and data management, and 
in scope, with new methods ofmeasurement. The technical 
means of monitoring military endeavors can be extremely 
important for arms control for three fundamental reasons: 
( 1) They can remove worst case analyses such as that 
which caused the missile "gap" of 1960, (2) they can allow 
the US Congress and the Executive branch to have confi­
dence to accept possible arms control treaties,and (3) they 
can deter leaders from becoming too "adventuresome." 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the technical 
aspects! of some of the means of verification; therefore, it 
will not include discussions of such topics as the historical, 
political, and legal aspects ofverification; the criteria of the 
quality of verification ("adequate versus effective"); the 
possible vulnerability to "breakouts" from arms control 
treaties; the intemational means of verification by the In­
temational Atomic Energy Agency or the proposed Inter­
national Satellite Monitoring Agency; various cooperative 
means of verification where each side helps the other side 
with its ability to monitor; the specific terms of arms con­
trol treaties; and so forth. As in the other papers2 in this 
series of science and society tests, the calculations on the 
physics of verification will use only widely accepted nu­
merical parameters, and the results are consistent with 
those from more sophisticated calculations, or with experi­
mental data. In particular, this paper will quantify the fol­
lowing aspects3 of the technical means of verification: 
(i) Nuclear testing: Detection capabilities implied by 
the flux of x rays, gamma rays, and neutrons from explo­
sions in space; calibration ofthe yield ofan explosion in the 
atmosphere from the timing ofthe optical double pulse; the 
size of a cavity to decouple an underground nuclear explo­
sion; and the measurement of the high-frequency compo­
nents of seismic signals to detect decoupling in a cavity. 
(ii) Optical reconnaissance: Comparison of the perfor­
mance of film and charge-coupled devices; defocusing by 
looking downwards through atmospheric turbulence; reso­
lution with adaptive optics for observing satellites in orbit 
from the earth; enhancement of images with digital image 
processing techniques such as the Fourier tansform convo­
lution and addition theroems. 
(iii) Infrared monitoring: Resolution and detection sen­
sitivity. 
(iv) Radar monitoring: Synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR) and measurement of the missile coefficient. 
II. NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATIES 
A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which 
would ban all nuclear tests might slow the development of 
new weapons systems, would improve the political climate 
between the superpowers, and would make our weapons 
policy more consistent with the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT) of 1970 in which the nonnuclear-weapons 
states have given up their rights to possess and test nuclear 
weapons. The debate on nuclear test ban treaties has cen­
tered on the verifiability of such agreements, as well as the 
need to test to develop new warhead designs and to main­
tain the reliability of the weapons stockpile. In this section 
we would like to address the detection and identification of 
nuclear weapons tests in space (Sec. II A), in the atmo­
sphere (Sec. II B), and underground (Sec. II C). 
A. Tests in space 
The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 1963 forbids 
the testing ofnuclear weapons in space, in the atmosphere, 
and underwater. In order to monitor these treaties, it is 
necessary to determine the necesary sensitivity to detect 
nuclear weapons tests. What are the approximate magni­
tudes of the neutron, x-ray, and prompt gamma-ray fluxes 
from a l-kt weapon exploded in space at a distance of 
20 000 km from the new Global Positioning Satellites 
(GPS)? Assume4 that about 70% of the energy appears as 
x rays and 0.3% as prompt gamma rays, and that the aver­
age temperature of the initial fireball in space is about the 
same as the core of the Sun, 20 X 106 K. (lkt = 1012 
cal = 4.2X 1O!2 J.) 
Answer. The yield of a l-kt weapon is 4.2X 1012 J, or 
2.6X 1025 MeV. If one assumes that each fission event re­
leases about 200 MeV along with one extra neutron that 
escapes from the weapon, the total number ofneutrons that 
escape from a l-kt warhead is 
N(n) = (2.6X 1025 MeV) (I n/2oo MeV) 
= 1.3 X 1~3 neutrons. 
The neutron flux from a weapon of Y kt at a distance ofR 
km is 
(Y X 1.3 X 1023 )1(41T)(R X 105 cm)2 
= lO 12 y IR 2 neutrons/cm2 . 
The flux at a distance of20 000 km from the GPS satellite is 
101214 X 108 = 2500 neutrons/cm2/kt. 
The flux ofenergy from the x rays at a distance ofR km is 
U = (0.7)( Y X2.6X 1025 MeV1(41T)(R X 105 cm)2 
= 1.4x 1014 y IR 2 (MeVIcm2 ) • 
If the initial fireball temperature is 20 X 106 K, the average 
x-ray energy is about (kT = 1/40 eV at 300 K) 
E.v '"'-'3 kT 
= (3/40 eV) (20X 106 K/300 K) = 5 keV. 
The flux ofx rays at a GPS detector from a 1-kt explosion is 
U IE.v . = (l.4X 1014 )/(2X 104 km)2(0.005 MeV) 
= 108/cm2 • 
Since 0.3% of the yield appears in the form of prompt 
gamma rays and about 70% of the yield appears as x rays, 
the prompt gamma-ray flux is 
U = (0.003/0.7)( 1.4X 1014 ) Y IR 2 
=6x1011 YIR 2 MeV/cm2 • 
These results are in agreement with the results from the 
5Los Alamos Vela program.
B. Tests in the atmosphere 
A nuclear explosion in the atmosphere will give a unique 
double-peaked optical signature (Fig. 1). The initial burst 
ofx rays lasts less than 1Its; these x rays are absorbed in the 
first few meters of air and their energy then "diffuses" to 
create a fireball by heating4,6 the air to about 106 K. Shortly 
afterwards a shock wave carries the energy beyond the fire­
ball. Since this high-temperature shqcked gas is ionized, it 
is opaque to the optical radiation from the fireball behind 
it, thus reducing the luminosity of the fireball. After the 
shocked gas has expanded and cooled, it again becomes 
transparent to light, and the intensity of the fireball again 
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Fig. 1. Optical double pulse from a bhangmeter. The optical double pulse 
of a 19-kt nuclear weapon exploded in the atmosphere. Figure courtesy of 
Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
delay times of the first minimum and second maximum in 
the light intensity to obtain estimates for the yield of a 
weapon. Optical "bhangmeters" have been devised to de­
tect double pulses above the background of the intense 
brightness of the earthshine. Since the hydrodynamical 
and radiation transport mechanisms of nuclear explosions 
are very complex, one can only roughly estimate these rela­
tive delay times. Estimate the time from the explosion to 
the minimum light intensity when the shocked region has 
expanded beyond the fireball ("breakaway") and blocks 
the radiation from the fireball. The radius of the fireball at 
"breakaway" is4 R = 520 y O.4 , where R is in meters and Y 
is in Mt. For the case of Y = 20 kt, use an average tempera­
ture4 ,6 of 100 000 K during the time regime (ms) of break­
away. The shock front velocity is not very different from 
the velocity of sound at very high pressures and tempera­
tures, 
Answer. The average shock velocity for a 20-kt explosion 
before "breakaway" is approximately 
V(shock) ~ V(sound), 
= (331 m/s)(1oo000 K/273 K)1/2 
= 6400 m/s. 
The approximate time to the minimum emission at break­
way is 
t~520 y 0 .4 m/(6400 m/s) = 81 y O.4 ms, 
which is in good agreement with the empirical relation giv­
en by Brode,6 t = 60 y0.4 ms. For a 19-kt weapon, t~ ( 110 
m)/(6400m/s) = 17ms, which is in good agreement with 
the data5 of Fig. 1. Additional confirmation of the explo­
sion is obtained from coincidence measurements between 
the activation of the bhangmeter and the arrival of the elec­
tromagnetic pulse (EMP) which accompanies a nuclear 
explosion. Additional evidence will be available from the 
new GPS system which will observe any spot on the Earth 
with 4-8 (of the 18) GPS satellites at all times, The accu­
rate clock system of the GPS satellites will allow triangula­
tion methods to determine the position of a nuclear explo­
sion with great accuracy. Had these instruments been 
functioning in 1979, they would, most likely, have removed 
the ambiguity from the Vela data of the "event" over the 
South Atlantic. (In 1980, the Presidential Office ofScience 
and Technology Policy reported that the light signals were 
probably not from a nuclear explosion.) 
C. Underground tests 
Two of the main arguments that have been raised about 
the ability to monitor a Complete Test Ban (CTB) are as 
follows: (1) The nation that desired to cheat might dig a 
large cavity for its nuclear test so that the nuclear explosion 
would be relatively decoupled from the earth, thus reduc­
ing the amplitude of the seismic signal by as much as a 
factor of 60 to 200. (2) Because earthquakes and nuclear 
explosions create fairly similar seismic signals, it is neces­
sary to distinguish nuclear explosions from earthquakes. 
By using seismic magnitudes based both on short-period 
body waves (m b ) and on long-period surface waves (Ms )' 
several seismologists have distinguished nuclear tests from 
earthquakes as well as estimated yields ofunderground ex­
plosions. In order to maximize the capability to verify a 
CTB, each side must be able to observe seismic signals on 
the soil of the other country. Starting in the mid-1960s, The 
I 
Sandia National Laboratory built and tested unattended 
seismic stations,7 and now uses them in a network in the 
US, Canada, and Norway. A network of about 40 stations 
located inside and adjacent to the USSR could distinguish 
earthquakes from nuclear tests with yields as low as about8 
1 kt. The close proximity of the in-country stations would 
improve the capability to observe the higher frequencies 
(up to 30 Hz or higher). Identification ofthe type ofsource 
of the signal is based8•9 on the fact that explosions have a 
greater fraction of their energy content at higher frequen­
cies than do earthquakes. 
1. Cavity size 
Consider a nuclear explosion ofyield Yin a cavity in salt 
such that the pressure from the explosion at a distance (a) 
does not exceed the elastic limit (Po) of the medium. How 
large a cavity would be needed to decouple a 1-kt explo­
sion? Assume the elastic limit for salt is Po = 440 bar, and 
y = cplcv = 1.2 (at high temperatures). 
Answer. Since the explosion takes place very rapidly, the 
expansion is adiabatic with pv r = C, a constant. The ener­
gy Y of the weapon does work on the air in the cavity, 
Y= f -PdV= f -CV- r dV=CV 1 -r/(y-1), 
Y=PoV/(y-1) =Po(41Ta~/3)/(y-1). 
Using the values Y = 1 kt, Y = 1.2, and Po = 440 bar, we 
obtain a value for the minimum elastic radius, ac = 16 m, 
which agrees with the value calculated9,IO for a deep cavity 
several km below the surface. For Y = 1 Mt, ac = 160 m, 
and V would be 1000 times larger. 
2. High frequencies 
The frequency spectrum ofan explosion (U) is obtained 
by Fourier transforming the elastic displacement produced 
by a step pressure at a distance (r) from the explosion in a 
uniform medium,9.IO 
U(w) = (a3Pov)[(cr)(v2 -0.75a2 +ivaw)] , (1) 
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Fig. 2. High-frequency seismic detection. Relative seismic amplitudes as a 
function offrequency ofearthquakes, and nuclear weapons explosions (I 
kt decoupled, and tamped). The detection of the seismic signals from 
explosions are enhanced with respect to earthquakes at higher frequen­
cies. Figure courtesy of J. Evernden. 
where the compressional wave velocity v = 4 km/s and c is 
a constant. Comment on the high- and low-frequency lim­
its of U(w). 
Answer. Since the low-frequency limit of Eq. (1) , 
U(w«v/a) = Poa3/ cvr , 
is not a function of w, the' seismic frequency is constant 
until it drops (Fig. 2) at the "corner frequency." Since the 
energy Y of the weapon is proportional to Poa3, U(w ) .is 
proportional to Y and does not depend on a as long as 
a> ac' This is the basis ofLatter's statement IO that the size 
of the cavity does not affect the distant signal as long as the 
radius ofthe cavity is greater than the decoupling radius ac ' 
The high-frequency limit of U(w) is proportional to 
w- 2• Since the corner frequency of an explosion is greater 
than the corner frequency of an earthquake with the same 
spectral level at low frequencies, the signal from an explo­
sion is enhanced with respect to earthquakes and micro­
seismic noise at the higher frequencies. Thus the spectrum 
above about 30 Hz can help distinguish nuclear tests from 
earthquakes and seismic noise. 
III. OPTICAL RECONNAISSANCE 
The optical systems for reconnaissance have im­
proved11.12 considerably in a variety ofways: (1) Commer­
ical aerial survey films are now available with a high con­
trast capability ofabout 1000 line pairs per mm, or about 1 
f.l between lines. (2) Chromatic aberration has been re­
duced with the aid of computer-aided design and machin­
ing of lenses. (3) The blurring of a photograph by the for­
ward motion of a satellite has been removed by slightly 
moving the film relative to the lens with precise timing 
mechanisms and servo-control systems. (4) Similar ob­
jects may reflect and emit differently in the visible and in­
frared wavelength regions. These differences can be stud­
ied with multispectral cameras using multiple lens systems 
which take multiple (at least nine) photographs at differ­
ent wavelengths of the same object. (5) By using two views 
of the same terrain taken at different angles, one c:an obtain 
stereoscopic images which resolve the heights of objects. 
Such a cartographic camera in the space shuttle can cover 
an area of25 000 km2 in stero with a resolution ofabout 10 
m by using only a single pair ofpictures. (6) Fourier trans­
form infrared spectroscopy can rapidly and accurately de­
termine trace impurities in the air. In this paper we will 
discuss progress in four additional reconnaissance areas, 
namely for charge-coupled devices (CCD), adaptive op­
tics, digital image processing, and infrared. 
A. Film versus CCDs 
Compare the approximate resolutions available with a 
CCD13 with a pixel size of 10 f.l and films of 100 and 1000 
lines/mm. Assume a camera focal length (j) of 6, a lens 
diameter (D) of 1 m, and a camera altitude of 120 km. 
Some have said that it is possible to read the masthead of 
the newspaper Pravda from a satellite; is this possible? 
Answer. Since the object distance (0 = 120 km) is much 
greater than the focal length ( f = 6 m), the image distance 
is i = f = 6 m. The resolution of the image is about 10 f.l 
(hi) for the film of 100 lines/mm (1 line/1O- 5 m). This 
corresponds to an object resolution of 
ho = hi (o/i) = (10-5 m) (12 X 104 m/6 m) = 20 cm. 
The angular spread from diffraction effects since the dif­
fraction limit for a 1-m lens is about 
0d = 1.UID= (1.2)(5XIO- 7 m)/(1 m) =0.6 ,urad. 
The value of 1.U ID is a reasonable compromise between 
the full width between the diffraction minima (2.4 AID) 
and the full width at half-maximum intensity (0.8 AID). 
The diffraction broadening can be neglected here because 
0d' the diffraction limit, is much less than the angular un­
certainty from the 1O-,u film, . 
Of = H;li = 10-5/6 = 1.7 ,urad. 
The 1000-lines/mm film (hi = 1,u) would introduce an 
angular spread of0.17 J.lrad, but this film and camera com­
bination does not give the theoretical resolution of ho = 2 
cm because the diffraction spread of°d = 0.6,urad exceeds 
the film spread of Of = 0.17 ,urad. (Real systems may 
achieve resolutions about midway between these two ex­
treme cases, or, perhaps, about 10 cm.) To improve the 
resolution to the limit caused by atmospheric turbulence 
(Sec. III B), it is desirable to go to larger lenses, as for 
example the 2.4-m mirror of the space telescope. 
CCDs are in many ways mucll more attractive than film 
for photo-reconnaissance because they can be used in real­
time with computers, they can be reused (the amount of 
available film often detemiinesthe useable life of a photo­
graphic satellite), they are sensitive to a broader range of 
frequencies, they have a much greater dynamic range 
between black and white, their response is extremely linear 
compared to the nonlinearity offilm, and they are about 70 
times more efficient in using light than film. CCDs will be 
used in the space telescope (1600X 1600 pixels, about 10,u 
in size) to obtain resolutions ofabout 0.3 to 0.5 ,urad. How­
ever, .the larger pixel size of CCDs is exacerbated by an 
additional factor of !ibout 2 since it takes about 2 to 2.5 
pixels to obtain the same ground information as one line 
pair from film. Thus it willbe necessary to use CCDs with 
longer focal length (or folded optics) cameras. [Since the 
better resolutions (2 cm) from the better films ( 1000 linesl 
mm) are unobtainable because of diffraction limitations, 
the CCDs would not have to compete with that situation by 
having a focal lengths of (10 for pixel) (2 for CCD) = 20 
times longer.] Ultimately, the criteria for the use of CCDs 
rests on (l) what resolution is necessary to do the job and 
(2) data handling ability. If the resolution of a reconnais­
sance satellite was 10 cm, it should not be possible to read 
the Pravda masthead, but it should be possible to distin­
guish a VW Beetle from a Chevrolet Vega. It should be 
possible to obtain sufficient of resolutions with CCDs by 
increasing the focal length of 6 m by a factor of about 5. 
Because of their many advantages, CCDs are becoming 
very important for verification even if long focal length 
systems have to be built, or if some resolution has to be 
sacrificed. By taking occasional CCD pictures of large 
areas and subtracting them in the computer from previous 
pictures taken in the same season, changes in the scenery 
can be observed. 
B. Looldng downward versus upward 
Stars twinkle at night because of the variations in refrac­
tion in the air cells caused by turbulence in the atmosphere. 
The problem of looking downward from a satellite is con­
siderably smaller than looking upward (the "seeing") 
from a telescope, which is about 5 ,urad (1 arcsec). The 
"seeing" looking downward should be less since the satel­
lites are more than 10 times further from the turbulence. 
How might the asymetries of this phenomena be illuminat­
ed using ( 1) the simple lens formula, (2) an optical bench, 
and (3) a shower curtain. 
Answer. (1) Using a ~-m converging lens, establish an 
image of an object with some fine detail, such as a wire 
mesh, that is about 5 m from the lens. Place a bunsen 
burner first near the object, and then near the lens. Note 
that the turbulence from the burner does not noticably dis­
tort the image when it is close to the object, but that it does 
distort the image when it is placed near the lens. (2) Apply 
the thin lens equation to a two-lens system in which the first 
lens has a long focal length, implying turbulence in the 
Earth's atmosphere, and the second lens is the camera lens. 
By slightly shifting the location (or its focal length ) of the 
first lens, the position of the final image is slightly shifted. 
For the reconnaissance case, when the first lens (the atmo­
sphere) is close to the object (the missile silo) and far from 
the second lens (the reconnaissance camera), the effect of 
shifting the lens is very small (second order I4 ). For the 
astronomical case, when the first lens (the atmosphere) is 
close to the second lens (the telescope) and far from the 
object (the stars), the correction for the final image loca­
tion is larger (first order). (3) The next time you are taking 
a shower with a translucent shower curtain, observe that 
you are unable to see objects clearly through the curtain, 
but if you look over the curtain into a distant mirror, you 
will be able to see quite clearly your hand near the curtain. 
C. Adaptive optics 
For the case of large diameter cameras, atmospheric tur­
bulence is not as significant a problem for reconnaissance 
satellites as it is for taking pictures from the earth of astro­
nomical objects and satellites in orbit. The technique l5 of 
adaptive optics (AO) has been used to improve the resolu­
tion ofEarth-based telescopes to nearly the diffraction lim­
it. Adaptive optics uses wave front sensors and wave front 
processors to determine distortions (the slope) in the wave 
front ofthe incoming light; this information is used to de­
form a mirror to correct for the misalignment of the wave 
front. (1) If the turbulent air cells in the troposphere at an 
altitute of 10 km have a size of about 10 to 20 cm, would 
adaptive optics be useful for observing objects in orbit from 
the Earth? (2) What is the limit to the angular resolution 
for cameras on the earth and in orbit caused by turbulence? 
(3) How deformable should the AO mirror be? (4) How 
good must the tracking for AO be to observe objects in 
orbit from the Earth? 
Answer. (1) Turbulence in the tropopause (10 km) 
causes angular blurring at the Earth-based telescope of 
about 
Or = 0.1 milO km = 5 - 10 ,urad. 
This is considerably larger than the diffraction limit of 0.6 
,urad for a 1-m mirror (Sec. III A), hence AO can be useful 
for monitoring objects in orbit. (2) Since reconnaissance 
satellites are more than ten times further away from the 
troposphere,Ot is about 0.5-1 ,urad; therefore, AO is pres­
ently ofmarginal use for reconnaissance satellites. Only for 
mirrors larger than about 1 m and for the best films would 
AO become attractive enough to warrant the effort for pho­
tography in low-Earth orbit. (3) Since the. wavelength of 
visible light is about 0.5,u, a deformable mIrror must pro­
vide about I fl ofcompensation with a precision ofabout 10 
nm (I % ). (4) The computer systems must be able to re" 
spond within about 1ms since the period of the atmospher­
ic disturbances is about 20 ms. Since a satellite moves at 
about 8000 mis, it would move during that time (1 ms) 
(8000 m/s) = 8 m. Itwouldbe necessary to have extreme­
ly accurate tracking of about 1% (8 cm/ms) of this value 
for the AO telescopes to retain a resolution of 10 cm. 
D. Digital image processing 
The advent ofelectro-opticai devices such as CCDs and 
very large scale integrated circuits (VLSIC) enhances the 
ability to monitor military activities. Digital image pro­
cessing (DIP) techniques l6 can restore and enhance pho­
tographs that have been blurred by a variety ofcauses. DIP 
can be used to subtract one picture from another picture 
taken at a later time to extract changes in the scenery dur­
ing the elapsed time. It can enhance edges and lines in an 
image, remove noise from the picture, enhance contrasts 
such as partially removing clouds, and search for various 
patterns such as circular missile silos or movable SS-20 
missiles launchers. These techniques have been applied to a 
, wide variety of fields such as photography, radar, sonar, 
and medicine. The formation of an image (g) involves ari 
image spreading function 
g(x,Y) = J:ooJ:oo he(x-xl'Y-YI) 
Xs(xItYI)dx j dYI + n(x,y) , (2) 
where he is the composite point-spread function (caused by 
object or image motion, distortions by the detector, and 
aberrations by the optical system), s is the direct and indi­
rect flux at the sensor, and n is the noise. The information 
that we would like to extract from the image to obtain the 
puresignal is compounded because the point-spread func­
tion is multiplicative and the noise is additive. It is possible 
to improve the extraction process by analyzing the image in 
the frequency domain through Fourier transforms. 
1. The convolution theorem 
Ifwe ignore the noise term in Eq. (2), its Fourier trans­
form to the frequency domain is 
G(u, v) = H(u, v) S(u, v) , (3) 
where G, H, and S are the two-dimensional Fourier trans­
forms ofthe image (g), the point-spread function (he)' and 
the signal (s) at the detector. The beauty ofthe convolution 
theorem is that the equation in the frequency domain is less 
complex since it is multiplicative without the integration 
operations. As a simple application, consider a one-dimen­
sional photograph of very narrow spots of light from two 
lasers which can be represented by delta functions. (1) If 
one observes an image 
g(x) = N(Ae - x 2/2cr +Be - (X_D)212cr ) , (4) 
where are the lasers, what are their intensities, and what is 
he? (2) How could he be determined for an optical system 
in orbit as it takes pictures of objects on the ground? 
Answer. If we assume a Gaussian point-spread function 
he =Ne-(X~XI)2/2cr 







Fig. 3. Fourier transform. (a): A one-dimensional silo 20 pixels wide is 
placed in a field ioo pixels wide. The photographic data, g(x), indicates 
that the silo is severely hidden by the large signal to noise ratio (SIN = I). 
(b): The spatial data is Fourier transformed to obtain its frequency spec­
trum: F [g(x) I = G(k). (c): The noise is removed from the photo by 
Fourier transforming only the lowest four frequency components back to 
position space to make the "silo" more apparent: F [G(k) I = s(x) for n 
only from 1-4. 
with N = (21Tcr) -1/2, one obtains 
12crg(x) =NJ:~ e-(X-XI)2 [A8(0) +B8(D)]dxl · 
Since this integral gives Eq. (4), our choice for he was 
correct. The intensities of the lasers are A and B, and they 
are located at 0 and D. (2) For the case of a real satellite 
system, the function he can be obtained by pointing a laser 
from the Earth to the satellite. The data (g) and the known 
signal (s) are Fourier transformed to give the Fourier 
transformofhe [Eq. (3),H = GIS]. Fourier transforming 
H to real space gives he; this function includes not only the 
point-spread function of the system, but also the turbu­
lence effects which vary with time. 
2. The addition theorem 
A picture of a silo can be partially hidden by a lack of 
contrast and photographic noise. In the case when the opti­
cal resolution is small compared to the size of the silo, one 
can ignore the point-spread function (he); Eq. (2) be­
comes 
g(x) = sex) + n(x) 
in one dimension. Since the diameter of the silo is much 
larger than the average wavelength of the noise, it will be 
possible to remove much of the noise in the frequency do­
main. The Fourier transform addition theorem is 
F [g(x)) = G(k) = F [sex) + n(x)] 
=S(k) +N(k) , (5) 
whereFis the Fourier transform. How can one remove the 
noise from a one-dimensional picture, 
g(x) =NNRnd(1) +s, 
where NN is the peak noise, Rnd (I) is a random number 
from 0 to 1, and the silo (s) is placed in only part of the 
domain? 
Answer. See Fig. 3 for the case of a silo 20 pixels wide 
located in a field 100 pixels wide with an average signal to 
noise ratio of SIN = 1. 
IV. INFRARED RECONNAISSANCE 
Infrared technologies have developed17 to the point 
where scanning devices routinely detect temperature dif­
ferences of about 0.1 K. Infrared pictures from satellites 
can be useful for a variety of verification tasks: counting 
"warm" missile silos to determine compliance with SALT, 
determing activity at nuclear production reactors and at 
enrichment and reprocessing facilities to monitor a freeze 
on the production of fissile isotopes (Pu, U-235), to ob­
serve tests of space weapons (ASAT and BMD), and so 
forth. The infrared reconnaissance satellites detect a differ­
ent kind ofdata (heat), but they are not as capable as those 
operating in the visible region at this time. The ir satellites 
use smaller arrays ofup to 20 000 detectors as compared to 
optical CCDs with arrays of 3 million detectors. 
A. Resolution 
There are two windows in the atmosphere which trans­
mit ir, between 3 and 5fL and between 8 and 14fL. For space 
based photography the 8 to 14-fL window is often preferable 
because most of the Earth is at 300 K (10 fL), and the 8 to 
14-fL window is further removed from reflected sunlight at 
0.5 fL. (1) What is the maximum resolution in the 8 to 14~fL 
region from a satellite at an altitude (0) of 120 km, using a 
mirror diameter (D) of 1 m and folded, long-focal-length 
optics? (2) How would one have to modify Si to detect ir 
radition? 
Answer. ( 1) Since the longer wavelengths for ir radiation 
increase the diffraction limit of the angular resolution, we 
will neglect the geometrical spreading from the size of the 
detector. For case of 14-fL ir radiation with a 1-m mirror, 
we obtain 
0d = I.UID= (1.2)(14XlO- 6 m)/(1 m) = 20fLrad , 
which gives a mimimum spatial resolution of 
ho = Oed = (120 km) (20 fLrad) = 2 - 3 m. 
This result is consistent with the resolutions obtained in 
recent astronomical ir measurements: The IRAS satellite 
observed a ring ofsolid material at an angle of50fLrad from 
the star Vegas, Mt. Polomar has obtained 4 fLrad in the ir, 
and the 4-m Kitt Peak telescope observed a "planet" 5fLrad 
from the star VB-8. Infrared photography does notresolve 
objects as well as photography using visible light, but it is 
sufficient to detect silos and vehicles. (2) When an impuri­
ty such as Ga is incorporated into Si, it has energy levels at 
about 0.1 eV above the valence band which can be excited 
by the lO-fL radiation since E = 1.24. Semiconducting 
compounds with narrow bandgaps also are used to detect ir 
light. 
B. ir temperature sensitivity 
What accuracy is required to measure temperatures of 
objects near room temperature differences to within 
!:J.T=O.OI K? 
Answer. Since the maximum of the blackbody curve (10 
fL for 300 K) is approximately in the center ofthe 8- to 14-fL 
window, the integral response of the detector is approxi­
mately proportional to T 4 for small changes in temperature 
(!:J.T). (This can be shown with numerical integrations of 
the Planck distribution function.) The difference in accu­
mulated charge or voltage is approximately proportional to 
!:J.(aT 4 ) = (aT 4 )(4!:J.TIT) 
when !:J.T«T. For !:J.T= 0.01 K and T= 300 K, the re­
quired accuracy is about (4) (Om K)/300 K = 0.01 %, 
i.e., the charge accumulated in the ir detector would have 
to be measured with an accuracy ofone part in 10 000. The 
ir radiation emitted by the atmosphere gives a background 
radiation noise which tends to degrade the accuracy of the 
temperature measurement from a satellite. 
C. Detection of cool objects at a distance 
The quantum efficiency of a Si:Ga detector in the ir re­
gion is about 0.5. Determine if an ir detector can detect a 
cool (273 K) object with a total area of 1m2 (a satellite or a 
reentry vehicle) at a distance of 1000 km. (1) What rate of 
charge collection could be obtained by a detector that uses 
a I-m diameter mirror to enhance its effective area? About 
35% of the blackbody radiation from an ice cube (273 K) 
falls within the 8- to 14-fL window. Since the object is in 
space, the background radiation can be ignored. (2) What 
signal to noise (SIN) ratio (from the thermal noise in the 
detector) might be expected if the detectivity (D) is about 
5X 1012 where D = (S/N)IP, where P is the ir power on 
the detector from the cool object in the 8- to 14-fL window. 
This value ofD was multiplied by a factor of 100 to account 
for detector size, amplifier bandwidth, and field of view. 
Answer. (I) The object radiates (between 8 and 14 fL, in 
mks units) 
Pir = (0.35)(aT 4A) 
= (0.35)(5.7X10-s)(2734 )(1) = 110 W. 
At a distance of 1000 km (R) the I-m-diam (D) mirror 
collects 
P= (Pir )(D 2/16R 2 ) =7XlO- 12 W. 
This corresponds to a photon (average photons of 11 fL, 
0.11 eV) flux at the detector of 4 X lOs per second. Since 
the quantum efficiency is 0.5, about 2X lOs electrons/s 
could be collected by the detector. The signal to noise ratio 
would be about 
SIN = DP= (5X 1012 )(7 X 10- 12 ) = 35. 
Since both the SIN ratio and the charge collection rate are 
large, the detection time can be quite short. 
V.RADAR 
A. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) 
SAR systems lS mounted in satellites are presently used 
to obtain maps of features on the Earth and the planets as 
well as to monitor military activities. Because the wave­
length ofradar waves is longer than optical waves, the reso­
lution from SAR is not as good as that obtained with opti­
cal systems. However, radar has the greatattribute that it 
can be used during the night and when the Earth is covered 
with clouds, rain, or foliage. To obtain high resolution ra­
dar images of the Earth from a satellite would require an 
antenna several miles long. To circumvent this problem, 
the motion of the satellite or aircraft carrying the SAR 
system is used to increase the effective size of the antenna. 
A resolution of about 25 m has been obtained with the 
SEASAT satellite at an orbit height of 800 lan. Consider­
ably better resolutions of 1-3 m are possible at a higher 
radar frequency of 10 GHz, and at lower altitudes. For 
example, consider the case of a radar operating at 6 GHz 
(A = 0.05 m) at a slant range ofR = 200 km. (1) What is 
the effective size ofa SAR antenna needed to obtain a reso­
lution (AR) of 5 m? (2) What is the processing time to 
obtain this resolution? 
Answer. (1) the angular resolution is approximately 
(2) ()d = aR /R = 25 f-lrad = A /2D. 
(The synthesized antenna produces an effective beam 
width from an antenna which is twice the synthetic an­
tenna length.) This give a synthetic aperture ofD = 1000 
m. (2) Since the orbital velocity is about 8 km/s, the pro­
cessing time for the SAR system must be about (1 km/8 
km/s) = 0.1 s. Longer processing times would improve re­
solution in the tracking direction parallel to the velocity of 
the satellite, but it can never be better than! of the width of 
the actual physical antenna. As in the case of optical sys­
tems, the best achievable resolutions would be limited by 
atmospheric inhomogeneities and radar stability. Three­
dimensional surface maps can be obtained by either placing 
two antennas on a satellite or airplane, or by comparing 
data from two successive passes over the region of interest. 
B. Missile coefficient 
In order to monitor "new types" of missiles under 
SALT, it is necessary to be able to determine some quanti­
tative aspects of individual reentry vehicles (RV) from 
ICBMs. The accuracy ofan RV will be increased ifthe drag 
forces are small compared to its weight since the drag force 
disturbs the trajectory in unpredictable ways. The ratio of 
an RV's weight (W) to its effective area (CDA, where CD is 
the drag coefficient) is called its missile coefficient, 
{3 = W /CDA, usually given in English units. How can ra­
dar be used to measure(3, and thus monitor the accuracy of 
anRV? 
Answer. By measuring the Doppler shift (6.j) of the 
reflected radar signal, the velocity can be determined from 
a/= 2v//e, 
where / is the radar frequency and v is the velocity of the 
RV. By measuring the change of a/with time, one can 
determine the deceleration of the RV in the atmosphere. 
The deceleration gives the ratio of the weight to the drag 
force (0 = FD/m) to obtain{3. The value of{3 for an accu­
rate RV of 800 Ib with an area of 3 ft and a drag coefficient 
CD of 0.15 is about 
{3 = W /CDA = (800 1b)/(0.15) (3 fe) = 1800 Ib/fe. 
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